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Abstract 
Christina Lafont has argued that the early Heidegger’s reflections on truth and 
understanding are incompatible with ‘the supposition of a single objective world’. 
This paper presents her argument, reviews some responses that the existing Heidegger 
literature suggests (focussing in particular on work by John Haugeland), and offers 
what I argue is a superior response. Building on a deeper exploration of just what the 
above ‘supposition’ demands (an exploration informed by the work of Bernard 
Williams and Adrian Moore), I argue that a crucial assumption that Lafont and 
Haugeland both accept must be rejected, namely, that different ‘understandings of 
Being’ can be viewed as offering ‘rival perspectives’ on a common subject-matter. I 
develop this case by drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian 
‘understanding of Being’ might be like.  
Christina Lafont has posed a fascinating challenge to those who would see 
something insightful in the early Heidegger’s reflections on truth and understanding, a 
challenge which, I believe, has yet to be met. She argues that Heidegger’s claims 
about the need for ‘disclosures’ of ‘being’, which ‘found’ propositions and the 
possibility of propositional truth, undermine ‘the idealization of a single, objective 
world’: ‘the supposition of a single objective world of entities independent of 
language’ (2000: 230, 3) and ‘of any particular way of conceiving it’ (1999: xv). 
 Sec. 1 of the paper presents the case that Lafont makes. Sec. 2 explores some 
responses that the existing literature on Heidegger suggest, focusing in particular on 
work by John Haugeland. I argue that the response that this work suggests fails 
because it cannot make sense of different ‘understandings of Being’ offering better or 
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worse appreciations of a common body of objects. But that very fact points us to a 
better response to Lafont. Despite its importance for her argument, Lafont actually 
leaves largely undiscussed the key ‘supposition’ identified above and Sec. 3 turns to 
what is perhaps the most influential account of that ‘supposition’, that offered by 
Bernard Williams in his discussion of ‘the absolute conception’. That discussion lends 
further credence to Lafont’s worries but also helps further clarify the alternative 
response to Lafont that I will defend. It does so by drawing our attention to an 
assumption that Lafont and Haugeland share, one which I will argue we should reject, 
and by focussing our attention on a sense in which Heideggerian ‘disclosures of 
being’ ought to be understood as offering perspectives on the world and a sense in 
which they ought not. In the rest of the paper, I explain these different senses by 
drawing on an alternative account of what a Heideggerian ‘understanding of Being’ 
might be like. 
1. Lafont’s criticism of Heidegger  
Lafont declares that ‘the fact from which Being and Time starts, and which lies 
at the basis of Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole.’ (Lafont 2000: xiii) is that ‘[w]e 
always move about in an understanding of Being’ (Heidegger 1962: 25). Only on the 
basis of such an ‘understanding of Being’ or ‘disclosure of Being’  is a world of 1
entities and states of affairs revealed to us such that they might become the subject 
matter of propositions we might entertain.  Where Heidegger goes astray, Lafont 2
argues, is in believing that an ‘understanding of Being’, by virtue of being a 
precondition of such ‘world-disclosure’, is therefore ‘necessarily immunized against 
intraworldly experience’ (Lafont 2000: 229): 
Such an understanding of being or world-disclosure has … a quasi-
transcendental status. … [I]it is valid a priori, … in the sense that it cannot be 
 I will use these expressions interchangeably.1
 Cf., e.g., Heidegger 1962: sec. 13, 33 and 44.2
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called into question from within, that is, by those who share it. There is no 
way to step outside of our understanding of being in order to check its validity, 
to test whether or not our understanding of being coincides with the being of 
the things themselves ... (Lafont 2000: xiv)  3
What distinguishes Heidegger’s outlook from a Kantian one is that he 
‘detranscendentalizes’ this understanding into a multiplicity of different 
understandings which are also ‘subject to historical change’ (2000:111 n.2, 110). This 
understanding  
is not the (eternal) endowment of a transcendental ego … Rather it is merely 
contingent; it changes historically ... (Lafont 2000: xiv) 
Lafont claims, however, that this vision of a multiplicity of ‘detranscendentalised’ but 
unrevisable ‘understandings of Being’ is fundamentally confused. We can identify 
three distinct, though related, charges. 
Firstly, these forms of understanding may be ‘synchronically absolute’ or 
‘dominant’ for those who share them, but a reflective awareness of their 
‘detranscendentalized status’ must lead us to see them ‘as tentative and revisable on 
the basis of experience’ (2000: 258, 111 n. 2). ‘[N]othing essentially factical should 
have absolute authority over us’ (2002: 231), so we cannot make sense of the 
‘contingent absolute[s]’ that such understandings supposedly represent (1999: 32). 
Heidegger’s failure to see this is his failure to ‘draw all the consequences that follow 
from his own detranscendentalization’ (2000: 111 n. 2). 
Secondly, this vision undermines the notion of ‘universally valid’ truth: each 
truth will be ‘relative to’ an ‘understanding of being’, distinct domains of entities and 
distinct bodies of truths being revealed to distinct understandings (2000: xv).  ‘There 4
is no absolute truth across incommensurable understandings of being or world-
 Cf. also Lafont 1999: 61, 65, 67, and 109.3
 Cf.  Okrent 2002: 196: ‘Dasein that live in the light of different understandings of 4
being encounter different ranges of entities’.
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disclosures’ (2002: 188) and Lafont concludes that such understandings are therefore 
‘utterly secluded and unalterable’: they are each ‘a coherent whole shut away in 
itself’ and, as such, are ‘incorrigible’ (2000: 158, 252).  Heidegger does indeed 5
declare that ‘we cannot ask at all about the “correctness”’ of a projection’ of Being 
(1999: 229, quoted in Lafont 2000: 143) and that might indeed suggest that, for 
example, the historical succession of one such ‘projection’ by another cannot be 
regarded as an ‘improvement in our conceptions of the same objective world’ (Lafont 
2000: 230). It is in this way that the ‘supposition’ that these different understandings 
and their different truths concern ‘a single, objective world’ would appear to be lost. 
Thirdly, the process by which ‘understandings of being’ come to replace one 
another becomes a mystery. We cannot now ‘conceive the historical changes in our 
understanding of being as a learning process’ and the impression that we can must, for 
Heidegger, be ‘just an illusion’ (Lafont 2000: xv). No option remains for Heidegger, 
Lafont argues, other than seeing new disclosures as emerging out of the unfathomable 
workings of - in a nice turn of phrase - ‘a demiurgic language, alien to any 
intraworldly activity’ (Lafont 1999: 74).  
2. Possible Responses to Lafont 
How might one respond to Lafont’s claims? One might take what Moore calls 
the ‘nihilist’ option (1997: 106), that of simply dispensing with the ‘supposition’. 
Some followers of Heidegger’s perhaps might be seen as embracing this option,  and 6
sense might perhaps be made of it. But I won’t attempt to do so here and will instead 
focus on the ‘anti-nihilist’ strategy of arguing that Heidegger’s outlook is not in 
tension with our key ‘supposition’ after all.  
 Cf. also Rentsch 1989: 166: ‘Being and Time’s uncritical concept of truth as 5
“disclosure” … precludes the affirmation of all [time- and culture-] “transcendent” 
truth’ (translation quoted in Young 1997: 93).
 This is how Moore reads Derrida in his 1997: 96-8, 107-8.6
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Dreyfus (2002) offers such an argument. Lafont draws on ideas from Putnam, 
Kripke and Donnellan in claiming that only the use of directly referring expressions 
allows us to retain our ‘supposition’, making it possible for thinkers who possess 
different ‘understandings of Being’ to refer, nevertheless, to the same entities.  7
Dreyfus challenges Lafont’s criticisms by arguing that Heidegger can accommodate 
direct reference: indeed he claims that Heidegger’s reflections on ‘formal indication’ 
show that he had ‘discovered on his own’ the linguistic phenomenon variously 
dubbed ‘direct reference’ and ‘rigid designation’ (2002: 192). However, I share 
Lafont’s view that ‘Heidegger’s understanding of “formal indication” has nothing to 
 Whether direct reference can carry this burden is a complex question I won’t 7
explore, a question made more complex by the further question – which I also won’t 
explore - of what kind of ‘account’ of that ‘supposition’ one might reasonably insist 
on receiving: for example, Adrian Moore has argued that this ‘supposition’ is a 
‘primordial thought’ (Moore 1987: 15) that cannot be given some ‘further’ or ‘deeper’ 
foundation. There are indications that Lafont shares Moore’s assessment (1997: ch. 6) 
that it would take something like a brand of transcendental idealism to justify the 
‘supposition’: she distinguishes Heidegger’s ‘understanding of Being’ from ‘a unique 
synthesis of apperception, valid for all rational beings’, ‘the (eternal) endowment of a 
transcendental ego (which would guarantee the objectivity of experience, and thereby 
the possibility of valid knowledge for all human beings)’ (2002: 187, 186, italics 
added). (Cf. also her 2000: 61 n. 57 and 1999: 65-66). But I suspect that she also 
shares Moore’s belief that that project is doomed and believes that the virtue of the 
‘direct reference’ approach, which – if anything - presupposes rather than justifies the 
‘supposition’, is merely that it is consistent with the ‘supposition’, whereas 
Heidegger’s outlook is not.
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do with “rigid designation”’ (2002: 233);  and I will instead focus here on the more 8
plausible brand of ‘anti-nihilism’ that can be found in the increasingly influential 
work of John Haugeland.  9
Haugeland suggests that a certain structure in our engagement with the world 
‘giv[es] content to the idea of being wrong’, and hence to that of ‘being 
correct’ (2002: 167). He illustrates this structure by pointing to aspects of scientific 
investigation and points to two forms of self-criticism that he believes are essential to 
‘being a genuine or honest scientist’ (p. 167). The first is embodied in a concern with 
‘communal norms of proper performance’ that govern, for example, the making of 
observations; such a concern ‘weeds out experimental results that are compromised 
by sloppy or improper procedures’ (p. 165). The second turns its attention to those 
norms themselves and arises out of the fact that ‘scientific laws and principles … 
sharply constrain how the results of various different experimental procedures would 
have to be related’ (p. 166).  This explains, among other things, why ‘replication … 10
matters’: 
Inasmuch as the norms of proper performance, together with the laws 
governing the objects under investigation, effectively promise that the results 
 Though Heidegger’s thinking tells us very little about those aspects of language that 8
theories of direct reference reveal - a charge which can, of course, be levelled at 
virtually every thinker prior to 1970 - it is not clear to me that Heidegger cannot 
accommodate some form of externalism (e.g., the view set out by Morris 2007 sec. 
5.4). I also believe that it is less than clear that the argument for the fundamentality of 
externalist aspects of language has been won. (Cf. n. 40 below and, for some recent 
defences of internalism, Wikforss 2001 and Farkas 2008.) For other assessments of 
‘Heidegger’s externalism’, cf. Wrathall 2002, Carman 2002 and 2003, Lafont 2002 
and 2005. I offer my own take on Heidegger's notion of 'formal indication' in my 
forthcoming-c.
 Cf., e.g., Smith 2007’s recent use of Haugeland’s ideas.9
 Cf. also Haugeland 2000: 60-61, 71-72 and 2007: 101-2. Other relevant discussions 10
include chs. 10 and 13 of his 1998.
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will agree, any disagreement means there’s something wrong somewhere. Of 
course, the most common upshot is that, on closer examination, one or the 
other of the experiments was not properly performed after all. Most apparently 
conflicting results are actually due to experimental error. 
But the more interesting case is when no such error can be found. Then 
scientists turn their scrutiny not on individual performances but on the very 
norms that determine procedural propriety for all performances of that sort. 
(Haugeland 2002: 166) 
According to Haugeland, Heidegger shares precisely this vision and sees the second 
form of self-criticism as the means by which ‘understandings of Being’ might too be 
attacked or legitimated. Haugeland’s Heidegger believes that ‘intransigent discovered 
impossibilities undermine a disclosure of being’ and that, by virtue of that fact, such a 
disclosure is ‘beholden for its “success”’ to discovered entities (2000: 73, 76). Once 
‘careful and persistent double-checking has eliminated the discoveries as the culprit’ – 
that is to say, once we have discounted ‘sloppy or improper’ application of the 
observational procedures in which, as we will see below, an understanding of Being is 
embodied - that ‘leaves the possibilities – in other words, the being of the entities 
discovered’ (Haugeland 2000: 72): our critical gaze falls on the ‘understanding of 
Being’ itself. 
Viewed as a response to Lafont’s worries, this view works, in one sense, by 
softening the distinction between ‘understandings of Being’ and particular truths that 
one might discover concerning particular entities. Haugeland glosses ‘the Being of 
entities’ in the following way: 
The being of entities is that in terms of which they are intelligible as entities. 
The qualifier ‘as entities’ (as I am using it) is short for this: with respect to the 
fact that they are (at all) and with regard to what they are. (Haugeland 2000: 
47) 
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He presents as an example of this the way in which physical entities are ‘intelligible 
via physical theory, especially the basic laws that specify how they can and must 
relate to one another’ (2000: 48): 
[T]he laws governing the objects are crucial to the very intelligibility of those 
objects as what they are. [For example,] how could one possibly understand 
what mass, force, momentum, and energy – not to mention electrons, orbiting 
planets, springs, and gasses – are, apart from how they figure (in relation to 
one another) in the relevant laws of motion, gravity, elasticity, 
thermodynamics, and so on? (Haugeland 2002: 171) 
But while Haugeland softens the distinction between ‘understandings of Being’ and 
particular truths that one might discover concerning particular entities, he does not 
collapse it, because the undermining of the former has a special significance by virtue 
of the fact that the ‘the means of discovering entities … themselves depend on the 
disclosure of the being of those entities’: 
The design of scientific instruments and experiments and the interpretation of 
their results depend essentially on the very laws and theories they sometimes 
test. Without a great deal of accepted physics, for instance, no cloud-chamber 
image or statistical pattern from a cyclotron could so much as make sense, let 
alone reveal anything. (Haugeland 2000: 73) 
In principle, therefore, the results of such testing can have radical consequences: they 
can undermine the very ‘disclosure of Being’ in terms of which they are understood 
and thereby ‘pull[] the rug from under themselves … along with … any other 
discoveries and abilities to discover in that region’ (p. 73). Unlike mere ‘factual 
mistakes’, which can be ‘identified and corrected’ and ‘life goes on’ (p. 75), the 
collapse of a ‘disclosure of Being’ is the collapse of a whole perspective on things. 
Indeed Haugeland sees here a basis on which we might understand Heidegger’s 
invocation of the notion of death: the collapse of a ‘disclosure of Being’ ‘is a 
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systematic breakdown that undermines everything’; as a whole way of seeing and 
investigating the world collapses, ‘that life … does not “go on”’: ‘[t]his is why 
Heidegger speaks of death’ (pp. 75, 73). 
How adequate a response, then, does Haugeland’s account offer to Lafont’s 
challenge? She shares Haugeland’s sense of the kind of view Heidegger ought to be 
presenting; but Lafont makes a strong textual case for thinking that he doesn’t do so: 
in particular, I believe that she is right to think that Heidegger denies the possibility of 
‘understandings of Being’ being ‘revisable on the basis of experience’ (2000: 111 n. 
2), the discovery of ‘intransigent impossibilities’ included. I won’t consider that case 
here. Instead I will present another reason to doubt whether Haugeland’s account can 
answer Lafont’s criticisms, reasons that remarks of Dreyfus’ suggest. 
Although Haugeland’s Heidegger sees ‘understandings of Being’ as 
‘corrigible’, it is unclear how Haugeland’s story can allow us to see a succession of 
‘understandings of Being’ as an ‘improvement in our conceptions of the same 
objective world’ (Lafont, quoted above). If abandoning an ‘understanding of being’ ‘is 
a systematic breakdown that undermines everything’, then it’s unclear how one moves 
on to a superior ‘understanding of being’ from there. As Dreyfus asks, does 
‘something remain[] aware of the collapse and survive[] to open a new world’ (2005: 
xxxv)? If all that remains is ‘a pure, isolated, world-needy mineness’ (p. xxxv n. 59), 
it’s not clear that the ‘stage-setting’ – to use a Wittgensteinian turn of phrase  - is in 11
place that would allow us to arrive through a ‘learning process’ at a grasp of ‘the new 
world’ and for that grasp to be an improvement on our grasp of ‘the old’. 
 Cf. Wittgenstein 1967: sec. 257. In defending my reading of Heidegger, I will draw 11
on Wittgensteinian ideas at a number of points below and this use may also suggest 
ways in which one might defend Wittgenstein himself from claims made against him 
that are analogous to those that Lafont makes against Heidegger: I have in mind 
Williams (1974)’s influentially ascription of linguistic idealism to Wittgenstein and 
Nagel’s claim that Wittgenstein ‘cut[s] the world down to size’ by making it 
‘dependent on our view of it’ (1986: 108-9). I won’t attempt to make good on this 
suggestion here but McManus 2003 explores some of the notions discussed here 
specifically in connection with Wittgenstein.
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One might worry that this objection rests on too literal a construal of 
Haugeland’s talk here of ‘death’.  But what is, in essence, the same objection arises 12
even before one draws on that rather radical extension of Haugeland’s reading: to be 
specific, an independently intelligible body of observations that might perplex one 
‘understanding of Being’ and be better accommodated by a another, new 
‘understanding’ would seem to be missing. It is unclear that we can envisage, as 
Dreyfus does in an earlier discussion of Haugeland’s work, our ‘disclosing a new 
world in which these anomalies make sense’ (Dreyfus 2000: 315), as a difficult 
question here is: which anomalies? If discoveries, like the ‘the means of discovering 
entities’, ‘themselves depend on the disclosure of the being of those entities’, then it is 
unclear how these same discovered entities might be identified by another ‘disclosure 
of being’ which we might conceive of as making better sense of them, rendering them 
no longer ‘anomalous’. Haugeland’s account may make sense of the notion of 
discovered entities undermining a ‘disclosure of being’ but it’s not clear how such 
entities might then be seen as better accommodated by another ‘disclosure’; there 
would seem not to be a common stock of discoverable entities to which a variety of 
different, rival ‘disclosures’ might be ‘beholden for [their] “success”’.  13
A full analysis of Haugeland’s rich and thought-provoking account and of the 
resources it might yet prove to have at its disposal in addressing this kind of charge is 
 Heidegger distinguishes ‘death’ from ‘perishing’ and ‘demise’ (1962: 284 and 291) 12
and Haugeland’s account  incorporates that. How, and how successfully, are questions 
I won’t consider here.
 For a related worry, cf. Beck’s proposal that, when we are forced to ‘relinquish [an] 13
understanding of Being’, ‘it is not at all clear that Haugeland can say anything about 
what happens next’ (2005: 168, 175-76). My reading offers an explanation of that 
awkward silence.
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beyond what I can offer here.  What I will offer instead is an alternative defence of 14
Heidegger from Lafont’s charges, one which takes as its critical focus precisely the 
thought that I have suggested Haugeland struggles to accommodate, namely, that of 
there being a common set of discovered entities revealed to more than a single 
‘understanding of being’.  15
But first I want to examine another presentation of our key ‘supposition’, that 
found in Bernard Williams’ reflections on the ‘absolute conception’. Despite its 
importance for her argument, Lafont says very little about the ‘supposition’, 
seemingly seeing it as a straight-forward intuition. But if, with Williams, we examine 
more thoroughly just what the demands of that ‘supposition’ are, we will see a 
Lafontian case for the corrigibility of Heideggerian ‘disclosures’ emerge but in a way 
that makes clear that that case rests on a key presupposition. It is a questionable 
presupposition which Lafont and Haugeland share, namely, that such ‘disclosures’ 
embody rival perspectives on what there is.  
 One particular issue that such an analysis would need to address is how exactly one 14
ought to understand the analogy that Haugeland suggests between ‘understandings of 
Being’ and natural scientific laws. What further complicates that issue is Haugeland’s 
rather unorthodox views of the nature of laws (cf., e.g., sec. 3 and 5 of his 
unpublished).
 The literature does, of course, include, and in other ways suggest, other ways in 15
which Lafont might be challenged. For example, Carman 2002, Okrent 2002 and 
Wrathall 2002 have argued that Lafont is mistaken in depicting the early Heidegger’s 
‘disclosures of being’ as essentially linguistic in character. But I think that Lafont is 
right to claim that this particular criticism misses the mark: ‘My concern here is the 
allegedly a priori status of such an understanding and not its specific structure or 
content. If it turned out that our cognitive capacities are essentially determined by our 
prelinguistic interpretive access to the world, I would not feel any better about 
it’ (Lafont 2002: 244). Despite his other criticisms of Lafont, Carman shares with her 
what would seem the crucial worry: that ‘Heidegger remained committed to a kind of 
ontological apriorism’ (2002: 206, cf. also p. 214). One of the reasons why I have 
focused on Haugeland’s work is that it questions precisely that commitment.
!  11
3. Williams and ‘Knowledge of What is There Anyway’ 
In his Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Williams sets out a ‘very basic 
thought’ about knowledge: 
If knowledge is what it claims to be, then it is knowledge of a reality which 
exists independently of that knowledge, and indeed (except for the special 
case where the reality known happens itself to be some psychological item) 
independently of any thought or experience. Knowledge is of what is there 
anyway. (Williams 1978: 64) 
Unlike Lafont, Williams believes that this thought – though ‘very basic’ - has 
‘consequences [that] can seem both demanding and puzzling’, so puzzling in fact that 
this thought articulates ‘something in [knowledge] which offers a standing invitation 
to scepticism’ (p. 64). But we will only follow Williams part of the way down that 
road; here is where it begins: 
Suppose A and B each claim to have some knowledge of the world. … [W]ith 
respect to their supposed pieces of knowledge, A’s and B’s representations 
may well differ. [But i]f what they both have is knowledge, then it seems to 
follow that there must be some coherent way of understanding why these 
representations differ, and how they are related to one another. One very 
primitive example of this would be that A and B were in different places ... In 
[such a] case, a story can be told which explains how A’s and B’s can each be 
perspectives on the same reality. To understand this story, one needs to form a 
conception of the world which contains A and B and their representations; A 
and B are not debarred from taking this standpoint themselves, but it involves 
their standing back from their original ways of representing these aspects of 
the world. (Williams 1978: 64-65) 
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‘This process, it seems, can be continued’, Williams observes, leading ultimately to 
what he has famously labelled ‘the absolute conception’. Williams argues that, since 
that ‘conception’ appears to be ‘basic to the notion of knowledge itself’ (1978: 65) 
and yet there appear to be reasons for doubting whether we can give content to that 
‘conception’,  a form of scepticism looms. But I won’t concern myself here with that 16
scepticism or with those apparent reasons. I will only consider the less obviously 
‘puzzling’ – indeed seemingly ‘incontestible’ - ‘need’ (1978: 64) set out at the end of 
the quoted passage. 
The passage presents a certain kind of explanation, embodied in the 
‘containment’ of ‘local’ representations within further, encompassing, less ‘local’ 
representations, a containment that explains how and why the world comes to seem 
the way that it does by virtue of people occupying different points of view. Explaining 
‘how the more local representations of the world come about’ ‘would enable us to 
relate them to each other, and to the world as it is independently of them’ (Williams 
1978: 245-46), as it is anyway. For example,  
[W]hen we understand, or merely have some vague idea of, the kinds of 
processes that underlie the phenomena of colour… we can easily understand 
why a thing should seem one colour to one person, another to another; or, 
again, why it should seem coloured to members of one species, monochrome 
to members of another. (Williams 1978: 241) 
The account that underpins such explanations of ‘the existence of rival views’ will, in 
some of those cases, serve as ‘a theory of error’ (1978: 301), explaining, for example, 
why certain members of a species at certain times will make judgments that they and 
others of their species would reject under what that theory suggests are better 
conditions for the making of such judgments. In such a case, the theory suggests that a 
‘supposed piece of knowledge’ turns out not to be knowledge after all. This kind of 
criticism would also appear to be applicable on a more general level, leading us, for 
 Cf. Williams 1978: 65 and 300-303.16
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example, to ascribe to members of a particular species a superior capacity to judge 
particular matters of fact than is possessed by members of another species. A space 
seems to open up here for reflection on how representations ‘work’, on how they 
‘relate … to the world as it is independently of them’, such that some can be called 
accurate and others not and the perspectives from which different individuals or 
species judge accurate or not. 
We are now in a position to see how these reflections might seem to pose a 
problem for Heidegger and substantiate Lafont’s critical invocation of our crucial 
‘supposition’. Long before one attempts to reach the (perhaps unreachable) ‘absolute 
conception’, our conceiving of different ‘understandings of Being’ as directed at a 
single, unified world would seem to require the possibility of our ‘standing back 
from’ those understandings and placing them within a more encompassing, less ‘local’ 
perspective. That perspective would explain how the representations of the world that 
these understandings ‘found’ ‘come about’; it does so by ‘relat[ing] them to each 
other, and to the world as it is independently of them’ (Williams, quoted above). But 
the possibility of such a perspective would give sense to a question of accuracy about 
‘understandings of Being’ and open up a space for their criticism: the more 
encompassing picture presents such understandings as either ‘working’ or not 
‘working’, and if the latter, then as a fit object for ‘a theory of error’. If one instead 
wishes to maintain the ‘incorrigibility’ of such an understanding, one would seem to 
need to reject this possibility and, in doing so, seem to reject our key ‘supposition’. 
But Williams’ account also suggests a rather different response. In the context 
in which it was initially presented, that account was as much a story of how apparent 
conflict can turn out not to be real conflict, of how apparently competing claims may 
turn out to be compatible, true of the same unified world. Examples of kinds of case 
that Williams has in mind are that ‘It’s raining’ and ‘It’s not raining’ can both be true - 
and ‘It’s raining’ both true and false – if these sentences are uttered in different 
locations: if that condition holds, the claims made simply address different bodies of 
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fact.  So what Williams’ account of our key ‘supposition’ brings out much more 17
clearly than Lafont’s – in as much as she provides one - is that two claims provide 
reason to think one must be subject to an ‘error theory’ only if the fact that they 
compete with one another has been secured. According to the account of 
‘understandings of Being’ I will offer, such ‘understandings’ do not compete. Like 
‘It’s raining’ and ‘It’s not raining’ uttered in different locations, they address different 
bodies of fact. But there is also a respect in which comparing such ‘understandings’ to 
such ‘perspectival claims’ is deeply misleading, as I will explain. 
The possibility of criticism described above only arises if ‘understandings of 
Being’ are understood as perspectival in the sense that they offer different ‘takes’ on 
some common target, ‘takes’ whose power to illuminate or obscure might then be 
understood and assessed by our ‘standing back from’ them and adopting a further, less 
‘local’ ‘take’ on them and that target. We see the same presupposition in Lafont’s 
argument: ‘understandings of Being’ must be corrigible, as otherwise we cannot see 
them as better or worse ‘takes’ on what there is, and such ‘understandings’ can only 
be incorrigible if ‘secluded’, that is, if there is ‘no absolute truth across … 
understandings’ (Lafont, quoted above, italics added). Here too, the claim that 
‘understandings of Being’ must be capable of correcting another rests on the 
assumption that they compete with one another. The same assumption is also at work 
in the response to Lafont that Haugeland’s work suggests, though, as I argued above, 
that response cannot ultimately make sense of that assumption. That response needs to 
identify common ‘discovered entities’  by reference to which one ‘understanding’ 
might be judged superior to another; and it founders, I suggested, because it fails to do 
 In Moore’s terms, the former utterances may be of opposed types but not express 17
incompatible contents, and the latter may be of the same type but express different 
contents (1997: 9-11).
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so: it can’t make sense of ‘comparing’ ‘understandings’ sharing a common ‘target’.  18
But that this is what we need to make sense of if we are to defend Heidegger from the 
kind of charge Lafont makes is itself taken for granted. I will argue that a different 
defence opens up precisely here where Haugeland’s comes to grief, in the possibility 
that there may not be common targets ‘across’ different ‘understandings of Being’. 
4, On the World, its Aspects and Common ‘Targets’ 
To take two of the very few examples of ‘disclosures of Being’ that the early 
Heidegger’s work offers, our understanding of the world as Zuhanden and our 
understanding of the world as Vorhanden reveal what one might call different 
‘aspects’ of the world and they do so in such a way that they do not compete with one 
another; they reveal different bodies of fact, not the same body of facts more or less 
well. In this sense, it is clear that being about the same world does not require mutual 
corrigibility; only being about the same aspect of the world - the same body of facts - 
does that. So what if different ‘understandings of Being’ stand to one another not – as 
Haugeland’s analogy might suggest - as different theoretical accounts of the physical 
stand to one another, but instead – to extend our proposal a little further - as claims 
about objects’ colours stand to claims about their owners, or their ages, or their 
distance from the Eiffel Tower? 
Someone persuaded by Lafont’s case might respond to this simple proposal in 
a number of ways. One response, which I will consider only briefly here, runs roughly 
as follows. ‘For there to be a single unified, objective world, there cannot be a 
multiplicity of “aspects” of the sort to which you have referred. All true descriptions 
 Haugeland’s account derives its apparent plausibility, I suspect, partly by exploiting 18
our unexamined sense that we already have a clear grasp of what we mean by 
‘physical entities’, such that these provide an independent and clearly shared ‘target’ 
for different specifications of ‘physical theory’, different sets of ‘basic laws that 
specify how [such entities] can and must relate to one another’. The objection I raised 
to that account questions whether Haugeland is entitled to trade on such a sense.
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of the world must ultimately turn out to be of a single “aspect”, otherwise we will 
have a multiplicity of “secluded” truths about the world and no absolute and 
universally valid truth, as befits a single, objective world.’ A natural candidate for this 
single aspect might be ‘the physical’, the claim then being that all true descriptions 
must ultimately turn out to be descriptions of physical features of the world. 
There is indeed a sense in which Williams’ reflections point us in this 
direction;  but one also finds in his work a recognition of problems that one comes to 19
confront in following in that direction. Among these are well-known problems for 
physicalism, problems that lead Moore to characterise the most that the ‘absolute 
conception’ can hope for as the ‘indirect integration’ of the many truths of our single, 
objective world, where a representation that ‘indirectly integrates’ others is one that 
‘weakly entails’ them (1997: 22, 16). To those considerations one might add those 
found in Haugeland’s discussion of ‘global supervenience’ (in chs. 5-6 of his 1998), 
Fodor 1974’s and Dupre 1983’s discussions of the ‘disunity of science’, and well-
known functionalist reflections. I cannot hope to discuss these reflections in any depth 
here or to settle here whether they embody insoluble problems for reductive 
physicalism.  But I do want to draw attention to the fact that, if it is to be defended in 20
 Cf. Moore 1997: 28-30 and 75-76.19
 For what it’s worth, I believe that there is room for relations of supervenience 20
between what different Heideggerian ‘understandings of Being’ reveal, given that 
there are reasons to believe that such relations cannot be required to be overly 
‘strong’. A kind of functionalism might represent a way of understanding the relation 
between Heidegger’s Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, for example, according to 
which these different ‘understandings of Being’ are both about a single world but are 
also clearly compatible. (For discussion of some of these issues, cf. McManus 1999.)  
I also believe that my view leaves room for theories which predict what the outcome 
of a particular exercise of a practice of measurement of the sort I will go on to 
consider – if carried out correctly – should be on a particular occasion. What I believe 
we are confused to expect is an explanation that would (somehow) show that the 
‘norms of proper performance’ of these practices themselves count as ‘correct’, the 
vindication of what counts as vindication referred to in Sec. 7 below.
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the manner that the previous paragraph outlines, Lafont’s critique now rests on 
premises that are much more contentious than her own presentation of her argument 
suggests. 
Another potential Lafontian response runs as follows. ‘The different 
“understandings of Being” that you have alluded to may reveal different aspects of 
reality - and, for that reason, do not conflict with one another - but we can still 
imagine different “understandings” of any one such aspect arising; these would be 
incompatible – would compete - and that opens up the possibility of corrigibility once 
again.’ I will argue that, with the right examples before our minds, this claim can be 
seen to be false. Seeing that requires that we recognize the potentially misleading 
aspect of the analogy between perspectives and ‘understandings of Being’ that I 
invoked above. We must distinguish two senses in which something might be said to 
be ‘a perspective’: it may take in one particular aspect of the world, or it may take in 
some particular object which might also be taken in by another such ‘perspective’.  I 21
will argue that ‘understandings of Being’ are perspectives only in the first sense. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will offer a way of thinking about 
Heideggerian ‘understandings of Being’ which differs from that which Lafont and 
Haugeland’s discussions suggest. Building on an earlier presentation of mine, I will 
question the assimilation of such ‘understandings’ to ‘takes’ on the world, whose 
‘accuracy’ might then be subject to the kinds of confirmation or disconfirmation that 
Williams’ and Haugeland’s accounts envisage. In the cases I will consider, and which, 
I suggest, offer our best models for ‘understandings of being’, belief in the possibility 
of reflectively ‘standing back from’ and ‘revising’ such ‘understandings’ is much less 
compelling, because the possibility of there being rival ‘understandings’ – ‘rival 
views’ - is much less compelling. By the same token, however, the notion that such a 
‘disclosure’ offers no more than a ‘tentative and revisable’ take on the world is also 
deprived of content: pace Lafont, we are not entitled, one might say, to the suspicion 
that these ‘original ways’ present anything less than ‘what is there anyway’.  
 These different senses would seem to correspond to Moore’s ‘points of view’ and 21
‘outlooks’ (1997: 81).
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5. Practices of Measurement 
Heidegger clearly believes that the mode of understanding proper to the ready-
to-hand [Zuhanden] provides us with what is, in some sense or other, a better model 
of understanding in general. The account I have offered elsewhere focuses upon the 
fact that the forms of intelligent action that Zuhanden objects involve, and which 
demonstrate our understanding of those objects, are themselves characterised by 
reference to the 'objects' that they involve and – crucially - therefore cannot be seen as 
fitting those ‘objects’. I will give a brief indication here of the account that emerges. 
Hammering, for example, is an activity that involves hammers: it is an activity 
that takes place among – as Heidegger would say, ‘bei’ (1962: 80) - particular objects, 
a way of using particular objects that cannot be characterised except by reference to 
those objects. One can, of course, distinguish the craftsman from his tools; but what 
makes him a craftsman is something to do with those tools: to understand what he 
does (hammering, say) is to understand the objects with which he does it (hammers) 
and to understand those objects is to understand what it is that he does. Heidegger 
tells us that such an object ‘can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own 
measure (hammering with a hammer, for example)’, and hammering ‘appropriates’ 
hammers ‘in a way which could not possibly be more suitable’ (Heidegger 1962: 98, 
italics added). This is so, I suggest, because here the activities of the subject – the 
person - are not constituted independently of the relevant objects.  For this reason, it 22
also makes no sense to talk of the former as corresponding to – or fitting - the latter. 
On the basis of suggestions of Heidegger’s such as that ‘theoretical research is 
not without a praxis of its own’ (Heidegger 1962: 409) and his repeated invocation of 
the motif of measurement in articulating his sense that propositional knowledge is 
‘founded’,  my account goes on to argue that the above feature also marks our grasp 23
 A similar thought can be found in Olafson 1987 p. 107 and Blattner 1999 p. 58: 22
‘Dasein’s abilities-to-be are interdefined with the functional roles served by 
paraphernalia.’
 For documentation, cf. McManus forthcoming-a: sec. 5.4.4.23
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of some basic physical characteristics of the world around us: in other words, the 
bearing of the above remarks extends beyond what one might think of as the province 
of the Zuhanden and into that of what is typically classed as the Vorhanden. At least in 
certain basic cases, the ‘practical’ achievement of mastering measurement procedures 
and the use of measurement tools is not merely learning a means for describing or 
accessing certain kinds of characteristic; rather it is learning what kinds of 
characteristic these are. For example, someone who did not understand that to 
measure the length of an object one needs to lay the measuring rod straight along it, 
as opposed to criss-crossing along it, is best described as being ignorant - not about, 
but  - of lengths. Laying the measuring rod straight along the object is not, so to 
speak, the best way of measuring lengths; rather that is what it is to measure lengths. 
Here too the activities of the subject - laying the measuring rod straight along the 
object - are not constituted independently of those of the relevant objects - the 
characteristic being measured being their length. For this reason, we cannot make 
sense here of ‘alternative’ or ‘rival practices’ which have the same object as - but also 
understand that object differently from – what we might be tempted to call ‘our own 
practice’. We cannot see our ‘own practice’ as ‘fitting’ – ‘corresponding’ to – those 
objects, while other, ‘alternative practices’ might be thought to fail to do so. Crucially 
for our present purposes, we cannot make a case for ‘our own practice’ - or to echo 
Williams, our ‘original ways of representing these aspects of the world’ - being 
merely one ‘take’ on those aspects or give sense to the notion that we are ‘confined’ to 
only that particular understanding of those aspects, to what we might confusedly 
conceive of as ‘our understanding’ of them. These realisations provide a sense for the 
claim that ‘we cannot ask at all about the “correctness”’ of a projection’ of Being 
(Heidegger, quoted above), a sense that does not entail a problematic idealism and 
that has application in connection with what we might think of as central cases of our 
grasp of objective features of reality. 
6. On the Absence of ‘Rivals’ 
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The kind of criticism of a perspective or descriptive practice that Haugeland 
and Williams envisage is surely legitimate when applied to descriptive techniques of a 
certain complexity, such as that embodied in the use of instruments of the complexity 
of a cloud chamber or an electron microscope. It might also be argued that they apply 
to some techniques that have become utterly familiar to us and of whose initial 
justification we need history of science to remind us.  But does that possible 24
criticism have an intelligible bearing on the yet more basic kinds of descriptive 
practices that I have described? In the construction and use of instruments such as 
cloud chambers, we have a clear sense of something akin to a means-ends distinction: 
a distinction between what one is trying to measure and how one is trying to measure 
it. But it is not clear that the same distinction can be projected in an illuminating way 
on to the practices with which I have concerned myself.  25
The following remarks of Wittgenstein’s echo my earlier claim that we engage 
in our practice of measuring length not because this is the best way to measure length 
but because this is what it is to measure length: 
One judges the length of a rod and can look for and find some method of 
judging it more exactly or more reliably. So - you say – what is judged here is 
independent of the method of judging it. What length is cannot be defined by 
the method of determining length. – To think like this is to make a mistake. 
What mistake? – To say ‘The height of Mont Blanc depends on how one 
climbs it’ would be queer. And one wants to compare ‘ever more accurate 
measurement of length’ with the nearer and nearer approach to an object. But 
in certain cases it is and in certain cases it is not, clear what ‘approaching 
 Cf. e.g., Haugeland’s discussion of Galileo’s need ‘to show, step by step, question 24
by question, that what appeared in the telescope really was something “out 
there”’ (2007: 99).
 Sec. 8 considers another example. Drawing a neat line between these two kinds of 25
case may also not be possible. Instead it may be that we must explore in each case 
whether we really have given sense to the ‘logical space’ within which a means-ends 
distinction might open up.
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nearer to the length of an object’ means. What ‘determining the length’ means 
is not learned by learning what length and determining are; the meaning of the 
word ‘length’ is learnt by learning, among other things, what it is to determine 
length. (Wittgenstein 1967: 224-25) 
The conceptual room necessary to imagine these particular practices as accurately 
acknowledging what is there, while others – rivals – do so inaccurately, seems then to 
be missing: these modes of ‘determination’ are among those cases about which we 
cannot tell a story of a ‘nearer and nearer approach’.  It may, of course, appear that 26
we can, but appearances can be deceptive: to take just one kind of example, and to 
draw on a distinction that Chang and Cartwright (2008) usefully discuss, I have 
argued elsewhere that many of the ways in which we may see the practices I have 
discussed as having been ‘improved upon’ are best understood as improvements in 
precision rather than accuracy.  To give here no more than a rough analogy, coming 27
to be able to measure to two decimal places may be a more precise form of 
measurement than measuring to one decimal place, but it does not follow that the 
latter form of measurement is any less accurate: one might say that the former 
measurements answer a question that the latter measurements did not answer 
incorrectly but rather simply didn’t address. 
It is my suspicion that we have no clear sense of the possibility that the 
practices under discussion might be ‘corrected’ - that there might be ‘alternative’ or 
‘rival’ practices switching to which would be a ‘nearer approach to’ the very objects 
 I argued above that we have no clear conception of the measuring practices in 26
question without invoking the ‘objects’ of that measurement, and I would suggest that 
we can plausibly add ‘and vice versa’, in that the person who masters such procedures 
knows what length is and the person who hasn’t doesn’t, irrespective of how much 
physical theory they may be able to parrot. This is not to deny that many questions 
remain: for example, would this mean that a person paralysed from birth could not 
come to grasp what lengths are? Cf. Collins and Evans 2007 for this worry regarding 
a range of views that give prominent roles to ‘practical skills’ in cognition. 
 Cf. McManus forthcoming-a: sec. 6.3.2 and 2007.27
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of our original practices - or that particular findings of theirs, which have been 
correctly judged to be correctly carried out by the lights of these practices, might turn 
out to be wrong. Haugeland’s second kind of self-criticism, the kind of criticism that 
he sees as directed at the Being of the entities disclosed, envisages our finding fault 
with measurements that, by the lights of the relevant practices, have been executed 
correctly. It is the norms embodied in those practices that are subject to that kind of 
criticism; but it is not clear that we understand what it would be to subject the norms 
of the practices that I have been considering to criticism. One can certainly imagine 
other practices with other norms: the above case of a criss-crossing use of a 
measuring rod is an example. But it is not clear that these would count as better (or 
worse) attempts to measure the same thing; these would be ‘means’ to other ‘ends’, at 
best determining how other bodies of fact stand.  28
7. Reflection, Idealism, and Concepts of ‘Perspective’ 
In his discussion of Williams, Moore describes the pursuit of a point of view 
on ‘things in general’ as a ‘goal of rational reflective self-understanding’ and indeed 
as a requirement for ‘full self-consciousness’ (1997: 22). In moving towards this view 
of ‘our place in the wider scheme of things’, ‘we begin to see why ... situations look 
the way they do from [particular] points of involvement’, attaining ‘a less narrow, less 
tainted, and less distorted conception of things’ and, in some cases, ‘vindicating’ our 
initial views (pp. 25, 35). Such self-consciousness seems familiar and intelligible but 
also incompatible with the Heideggerian vision of ‘understandings of Being’ as 
incorrigible; and I have indicated what indeed might be perceived as a limit on 
reflection, criticism and vindication, an obstacle to ‘full self-consciousness’. A certain 
kind of reflective self-understanding clearly does remain possible: I can give reasons 
why a particular measurement failed or ought not to be taken seriously, such as ‘The 
object slipped’ or ‘The ruler bent’, and by showing that such eventualities didn’t arise, 
 Ironically, this argument is similar in some respects to that which Lafont makes 28
against what she calls ‘the incommensurability thesis’ (2000: 273-75).
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I may vindicate other such measurements. But a further form of reflection, of a form 
that would correspond to Haugeland’s second kind of self-criticism, does seem to be 
absent here: we are denied vindications of these vindications and explanations which 
would let us see why the reasons mentioned are good reasons why such a 
measurement might have failed. But can we actually give content to the forms of 
reflection that we feel we miss here? I have suggested that it is confusion on our part 
that creates the impression that we can and this section will try to refine what that 
confusion is. 
Lafont proposes that Heidegger’s view of an understanding of Being as ‘a 
totality shut off in itself’ requires ‘the presupposition of a lack of alternatives’, but 
that ‘in the case of the sciences, this presupposition is seldom satisfied’ (2000: 286 n. 
20); I agree that that view only applies plausibly where that presupposition is satisfied 
but have suggested that there are interesting cases where it is. Among these one finds 
some of the most basic forms of understanding we possess; and that surely ought not 
to be surprising. But whether we are entitled to talk of these modes of understanding 
as ‘secluded’, as ‘totalities shut off in themselves’, depends on whether we can give 
sense to their being exposed to criticism or to a corresponding reflective vindication; 
and it’s not clear that here we can. If so, we should reject the insinuation of a certain 
failure of reflective or critical awareness and, for the same reason, reject both Lafont’s 
ascription to Heidegger of a brand of idealism and Haugeland’s corresponding claim 
that ‘understandings of Being’ are ‘arbitrary’ if not ‘grounded’ in the way he 
envisages (2000: 76). 
 Lafont does consider Heidegger’s invocations of the motif of measurement 
but, I believe, misreads them. Lafont states that, in such passages, when Heidegger 
refers to ‘a standard of measurement’, he means a ‘factual standard of measurement 
for the ascertainment of truth (… a criterion of truth)’ (p. 127 n. 20). Thus, for her 
Heidegger, ‘truth is identified with … specific, historically changeable standards for 
ascertaining truth’ (p. 168). Having ascribed to Heidegger this assimilation of a 
criterion of truth – a specification of how one might go about determining whether a 
particular proposition is true – to a definition of truth - a specification of what it is for 
a proposition to be true – Lafont sees Heidegger as guilty of an ‘exceedingly dubious’ 
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‘epistemologization of truth’ (2000: 155, 149, cf. also 166). But in the cases that I 
have presented, such an assimilation is harmless precisely because we have no grasp 
of the states of affairs in question other than through the methods of measurement in 
question.  29
 This view, however, might itself seem to point to a kind of idealism. To bring 
out how, let us return to Lafont’s argument that Heidegger’s ‘detranscendentalization’ 
should have led him to a ‘fallibilism’ about ‘understandings of Being’, to the 
realisation that ‘nothing essentially factical should have absolute authority over 
us’ (2002: 231, quoted above). One could make this criticism of ‘contingent absolutes’ 
in another way. If our ‘understanding of being’ is ‘constitutive for our access to the 
innerworldly’ then that ‘understanding’ would seem to be ‘insurmountable’: we would 
be unable ‘to distance ourselves from it reflexively’ (Lafont 1999: 67). If so, that 
might seem to undermine Heidegger’s ‘detranscendentalization’, in that the 
possibility that our understanding is only one among many possible understandings 
would seem to be one that we could not entertain. (The next section will offer a 
different construal of that ‘detranscendentalization’.) 
These reflections might still seem to point to a form of idealism, a particularly 
striking form but one familiar from discussion of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. According 
to this form of idealism, the fact that we cannot grasp these alternatives does not show 
that idealism to be false: the fact that we cannot think these ‘alternatives’ is precisely 
what this form of idealism would entail and makes clear the peculiarity of this idealist 
insight, that it is, in a sense, ungraspable, certainly ineffable. But I suggest that here 
we ought to remain – to use an expression from the Tractatus literature - ‘resolute’.  30
We are not entitled to the notion that we are ‘confined’ to a particular ‘understanding 
of Being’, one that we come to label ‘our understanding’, as would seem to be 
required by both idealist construals of the above claims and demands such as 
Haugeland’s that we ‘ground’ those ‘understandings’; we have failed to give that 
notion sense because we have failed to give sense to the notion of ‘rival’ 
 Lafont seems closer to the kind of insights I emphasise at 2000: 58, 60, 69-70 and 29
75.
 Cf. Goldfarb 1997.30
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‘understandings’. It is not that our ‘factical ‘disclosure’ – as ‘a fate into which [we] 
are thrown’ (2000: xiv) – renders us unable ‘to distance ourselves reflexively’ from 
‘our understanding’ but rather that we have yet to give sense to what that ‘reflexive 
distancing’ might involve. We confront not ‘something we cannot do’, as Wittgenstein 
might have put it,  but rather something we simply haven’t done. 31
There is then something misleading in describing the practices we have 
discussed as ‘ours’, as ‘local’ or – in one sense -  as ‘perspectival’. To make a point 
that echoes both Davidsonian and Wittgensteinian thoughts,  any agent we might 32
interpret as intentionally related to lengths will have to display in its activities 
something akin to ‘our’ measuring practices;  and although there is a sense in which 33
such ‘disclosures’ might be understood as offering perspectives on the world, there is 
also a sense in which they ought not to be. They only reveal part of what there is; but 
 Cf. 1967: sec. 374.31
 Cf., e.g., Davidson 1973-73. We also pass close by themes from the literature 32
surrounding the notion of a ‘disappearing “we”’ (e.g., Lear 1984 and Rorty 1972), to 
which Williams 1974 was a major contribution.
 There are, of course, more complex ‘technologies’ for measuring length than that 33
which involves the use of measuring rods, such as our ‘measuring atomic distances 
[by] putting together some complicated equations of electromagnetic theory or 
quantum physics with some observable quantities’ and ‘measuring astronomical 
distances … starting with the measurement of the time light takes in reaching an 
object and travelling back after being reflected’ (Chang and Cartwright 2008: 368). 
But my suspicion (and I won’t attempt to make it more than that here) is that the 
establishment of these new and more complex ‘alternatives’ is still an inherently 
‘conservative’ business, in that they establish their credentials – their claims to be 
methods for measuring lengths – by showing, roughly speaking, that their results are 
in line with the ‘old’ methods when applied to those phenomena to which we can 
apply both methods. (Cf. again Haugeland’s discussion of Galileo, cited in n. 24.) 
Something similar ought to be said, I’d suggest, about the experienced measurer’s 
capacity to judge lengths ‘by eye’, which might appear to be another ‘alternative’ to 
‘using our measuring practices’.
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there is, for instance, no element of perspective that must be purged from the 
representations that these ‘disclosures’ yield  if we are to be able to endorse them 34
alongside other representations true of our single, unified world. Unlike the likes of 
‘It’s raining’, these representations can be combined with others by what Moore calls 
‘simple addition’ (1997: 14) and, if so, and if an ‘absolute conception’ is indeed 
possible, there is no reason to think that they need be excluded from it.  This might 35
seem to deny us some further, ‘fuller’ ‘self-consciousness’ regarding how these 
practices work; but that is as it should be, as I’ve argued that, in these cases, the 
 Or at least none by virtue of their involvement, which is not to deny that a 34
proposition like ‘This river is 2m deep today’ is perspectival.
 We mustn’t overstate how much that in itself shows, as all ‘simple addition’ requires 35
is that a representation lack an element of perspective that prevents its endorsement 
alongside other truths. This is a weaker requirement than, for example, that its truth be 
predictable by broader laws. One might articulate this difference as one between a 
consequence of the requirement that the world be single and a consequence of the 
requirement that the world be simple – unified by some suitably small number of 
basic laws. For Moore, a representation’s being ‘absolute’ depends on its meeting the 
‘simple addition’ requirement; but for our key ‘supposition’, ‘[p]iecemeal 
endorsement will not be good enough’ and ‘[i]ntegration is called for’,‘or at least’, he 
continues, ‘indirect integration’ (1997: 280, 22). That qualification points to the same 
murky waters that I discussed briefly in Sec. 4.
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supposed ‘self-understanding’ we miss is an illusion, a ‘feat’ to which we have given 
no sense.  36
 Finally, let us note an interesting and perhaps unexpected possibility that our 
discussion opens up concerning the form that grasp of an ‘absolute conception’ might 
 The practices I have discussed would seem to instantiate what Moore calls ‘non-36
exclusive outlooks’, from which he distinguishes ‘points of view’ (1997: 81). (Cf. also 
his discussion (1997: 11-12) of how ‘the radically perspectival’ may be seen as 
‘absolute’.) The account I have presented makes a point analogous to that which 
Moore makes against varieties of transcendental idealism – namely, that we must not 
misconstrue the ‘limits’ of our different ‘understandings of being’ as ‘limitations’. 
(Cf., e.g., Moore 2003 and forthcoming: 912.) That Heidegger might embrace this 
thought is a possibility that I suspect Moore would be inclined to reject, and that 
reflects a deeper disagreement between Moore and myself over ‘the kind of bite that 
[Heidegger’s claims] are meant to have’ (forthcoming: 983). The above thought 
entails that a certain explanatory project must collapse - as ‘the contingency of our 
conceptual sense-making … disappear[s]’ and ‘”[o]ur language” comes to admit of no 
alternative’ (p. 537). That project, which I suspect Moore reads into Heidegger, is not 
unlike that which Moore sees in Wittgenstein and that which Lafont sees in 
Heidegger, namely, that of providing a kind of ‘grounding of necessity in 
contingency’ (Moore forthcoming: 529). So, for example, for Lafont, Heidegger’s 
‘understandings of Being’ are meant to be ‘a priori arbitrary and indifferent’ – and 
hence philosophically un-mysterious – but also ‘a posteriori necessary and 
indispensable’ (2000: 3) – which provides an explanation (of sorts) of how we come 
to find in our thoughts what we take to be necessities. Moore’s Wittgenstein avoids 
idealist confusions in exploring that kind of ‘grounding’ solely because he rejects 
certain kinds of explanatory questions it might be taken to answer. (For example, 
‘[w]e must not ask, “What does being an aunt consist in?”’ (Moore forthcoming: 
539)) But I see Heidegger’s own work as, in some important respects, much closer to 
that of a Wittgensteinian ‘reminding’, than the kind of explanatory project Moore 
envisages. (For an indication of how this case might be made, cf. McManus 2008: 
sec. 4, forthcoming-a sec. 9.2, and forthcoming-c.)
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take. Williams talks at one point of ‘local non-absolute conceptions of the world’ (p. 
301); my sense is that to the extent that it makes sense to talk of the practices under 
discussion as ‘local’ – or indeed ‘historical’ or ‘factical’ - it need not follow that they 
are ‘non-absolute’, merely ‘perspectival’. Williams talks of the need, if ‘the absolute 
conception’ were to be articulated, for ‘concepts not peculiarly ours’ (Williams 1978: 
244); our discussion suggests that we struggle to see the practices we have been 
discussing as ‘peculiarly ours’ in the sense of embodying our view of the matters in 
question with which the view of some notional others might contrast. But if the 
representations that these practices yield are fit for inclusion in an ‘absolute 
conception’ of the world, then that suggests that grasp of such a ‘conception’ may not 
be best thought of as a ‘disembodied’ achievement: rather than the ‘view from 
nowhere’ being merely a view, it may instead be a feat calling for the mastery of 
certain specific practices, though not ones that are ‘peculiarly ours’.  37
8. Lafont’s criticisms reconsidered 
Lets us return now to the three claims that Sec. 1 identified as the critical 
upshot of Lafont’s reading. How precisely does the account I have offered respond to 
these claims? Let’s begin with her worry that Heidegger’s ‘detranscendentalising’ 
postulation of a plurality of ‘disclosures’ entails that ‘the universal validity ascribed to 
truth is an illusion’ (Lafont 2000: 61 n. 56). In the cases I have considered, we have 
found that we lack the conceptual room, so to speak, to think of what the practices in 
question reveal as embodying merely ‘local’ ‘views’ of what they reveal. To grasp the 
facts that these practices make available to us we must master those practices; but that 
does not entail that they reveal anything less than how the world really is in itself with 
respect to – for example – length: what these practices reveal is authoritative – is 
 The question this possibility raises about a sharp distinction between 'manipulation' 37
and 'seeing' - between 'the practical' and 'the cognitive' – is precisely one which 
Heidegger himself raises: 'it is by no means patent where the ontological boundary 
between “theoretical” and “atheoretical” behaviour runs!' (1962: 409)
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universally valid - for anyone who asks about lengths. One just might be tempted to 
claim that seeing how the world really is in itself would require that we see it without 
the above ‘qualification’, ‘with respect to length’, and that truth with genuinely 
universal validity is authoritative for absolutely anyone and not just anyone who asks 
about particular issues (here, lengths) - not just ‘for those who share this 
projection’ (Lafont 2000: 257). But from the perspective I have offered, and with my 
examples in mind, this requirement comes to look like the demand that one be able to 
derive answers from the world without posing it determinate questions.  38
 My response to Lafont’s worry that any account of ‘understandings of Being’ 
as ‘contingent absolutes’ must be incoherent will take us back to the question raised in 
the previous section about how to understand Heidegger’s ‘detranscendentalization’. 
To begin, let us consider one of the no-doubt many objections that my account 
raises.  The objection is this: isn’t there something a little naïve about my account in 39
our post-positivist era? If a ‘disclosure’ of the sort that I discuss is ‘immunized against 
anything that could possibly contradict or question it’ (Lafont 2000: 112), wouldn’t 
such a ‘disclosure’ yield a set of ‘basic propositions’ of the sort in which no one 
believes anymore? 
 This, I suggest, is the sense in which ‘[i]n no case is a Dasein … set before the open 38
country of a “world-in-itself” so that it just beholds what it encounters’, and the sense 
in which ‘there are in principle no “bare facts”’ (Heidegger 1962: 213 and 414). 
Another possible source of the suspicion that Heidegger sees all truths as perspectival 
are claims such as that ‘“[t]here is” truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as 
Dasein is’ (1962: 269) and I discuss this and related remarks at length in McManus 
forthcoming-a: sec. 7.5. The discussion above also has an obvious bearing on the 
interpretive question of why we ought to think of the ‘understanding’ that ‘grounds’ 
propositional truth as itself a (deeper, primordial) form of truth and I have discussed 
this question in McManus forthcoming-a: sec. 7.2 and forthcoming-b: sec. 6.
 I cannot hope to offer a full defence of my account here but I have attempted 39
elsewhere to respond to some objections that the view from which this account is 
derived invites. Cf. McManus 2007 and forthcoming-a: sec.6.3 and ch. 7.
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My response is ‘Yes and no’: yes, in that we cannot imagine alternative 
perspectives on - or ‘rival views’ of - what they reveal but, no, in that we can imagine 
abandoning these practices, their ‘output’ no longer being of use to us. Wittgenstein 
talks, for example, of circumstances in which such practices would ‘lose their point’: 
The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by 
the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened for such 
lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious reason. (Wittgenstein 1967: 
sec. 142) 
Would we say that, under such circumstances, the findings arrived at through this 
procedure would be false? It seems more natural to say that it would be unclear what 
to say, that there would no longer seem to be something like a fact of the matter where 
once we had talked of ‘the weight’ of such lumps and held beliefs about such a 
property and such facts. Such beliefs might now come to seem to us useless, but not – 
it seems to me - false or mistaken; this ‘disclosure’ might be discarded, but not 
‘contradicted’. 
Hence, it would be misleading to apply to these ‘disclosures’ the description 
Lafont (2000: 3) takes from Hamann: ‘a priori arbitrary and indifferent, but a 
posteriori necessary and indispensable’. I have suggested that there is no way of 
coming to confront the properties and facts that these practices reveal other than 
through those practices; but those practices are also ‘not the (eternal) endowment of a 
transcendental ego’ (Lafont 2000: xiv, quoted above) and there might be 
circumstances in which they would prove themselves eminently dispensable. These 
understandings are ‘a fate into which humans are thrown’ (2000: xiv) in that we can’t 
imagine revising them; but we can certainly imagine not using them and it is this fact 
that entitles us to see these ‘disclosures’ as ‘detranscendentalized’, ‘factical’ or 
‘historical’. 
Is the account of the waxing and waning of ‘understandings of Being’ set out 
above how Heidegger himself imagines this process? Possibly not. But then, for all 
the talk of ‘the historical’ in the early work, he says surprisingly little that might allow 
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particular substantive interpretations of that talk to be defended. Later works talk of 
the ‘granting’ of a succession of ‘epochs’ in the ‘understanding of Being’; but I, like 
Lafont (2000: 113, 252), find no clear story there about the ‘mechanism’, so to speak, 
by which one such ‘epoch’ succeeds another; nor is there any clear reason to think 
that those ideas play a role in Heidegger’s early thought. Nevertheless, if ‘projections 
of Being’ are indeed ‘subject to historical change’, then something like the story I 
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have sketched here would seem to be necessary if it is also the case that ‘we cannot 
ask at all about the “correctness” of a projection’.  40
 Finally, let us look at Lafont’s third worry. Given my understanding of 
‘understandings of Being’ the worry that we cannot make sense of how one might 
replace another vanishes: different ‘disclosures’ do not rival one another in the sense 
 That story also raises a broader and - I think - very interesting philosophical 40
question. A suspicion of mine is that a fixation on direct reference may conjure up 
illusory ‘logical spaces’ by reference to which one might imagine a ‘disclosure’ 
failing, beliefs it makes possible revealed as systematically false. Direct reference 
seems to be able to ‘harpoon’ - and allow us to hang on to - the world even while our 
beliefs undergo tumultuous fluctuations; it would seem to allow us to label even the 
most misguided of these beliefs as ‘errors’, as failing to miss their target but – 
crucially - possessing that target nonetheless. Direct reference theorists might reject 
my suspicion, citing cases where directly referring expressions fail to pick out any 
particular individual (person, location, event, etc.) at all as ones in which the truth and 
falsity of claims made using those expressions are undermined. But the kinds of 
example I have discussed point us to the - Heideggerian and Wittgensteinian - thought 
that certain broad circumstances may be necessary if we are entitled to use the 
honorific, ‘error’. The broader philosophical question, on which I can only touch here, 
is: under quite what circumstances – in which broader contexts of cognitive peace and 
quiet, as it were - can direct reference perform its distinctive feat? Which kinds of 
mastery of the world around us (including true beliefs) must we possess - how much 
‘stage-setting’ must be place - for us to hang on to the line that direct reference 
attaches to the world and which ‘enables us to transcend the limits of our 
beliefs’ (Lafont 1999: xv and 2000: 8)? For example, while one might think that 'there 
is no reason whatever - intuitive or otherwise - to believe that having a word S that 
means X but not Y depends on being able, in principle, to tell Xs apart from 
Ys' (Boghossian 1990: 77), one might also think that 'our practice of using natural 
kind terms can exist and have the features that it does only because we have ... 
generally reliable abilities to re-identify particular specimens [of those kinds]' (Heal 
1998: 104).
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that one might capture the same subject-matter better than another. But my account 
does invite a related worry, in that it might seem to make it difficult to understand 
how the practices I have described could have emerged in the first place through what 
one might call an ‘intelligent’ or ‘intellectual’ response on our part to the world. But 
there are at least two things to be said here. 
Firstly, my account only rules out a hypothesis which - when brought out into 
the open – seems fanciful anyway; very crudely put, what we seem to mourn the 
passing of here is a story according to which we arrived at the practice of measuring 
lengths by judging – seeing directly, as it were - that objects were of certain lengths 
and then figuring out a handy way of ensuring these judgments were right, one 
involving the use of rulers.  Secondly, and relatedly, I believe it may indeed be rather 41
difficult to tell an ‘intellectualist’ story – one of a ‘learning process’ - about how such 
practices emerged. When a child learns them it is very much a matter of training; it 
seems much more natural to talk of their ‘catching on to’ or ‘getting the hang of’ such 
a practice, rather than, for example, their coming to see that it is, in some sense, 
‘right’. There would seem to be a similar distortion in imagining mankind first 
acquiring these practices ‘by satisfying [it]self of [their] correctness’ (Wittgenstein 
1974: sec. 94). 
Indeed the fact that it is the emergence of practices of the sort I have described 
that needs to be understood when we seek to ‘understand the emergence of 
understandings of Being’ gives us some reason to think the latter a tractable challenge 
and not one calling for a ‘demiurgic language’. On my account, an example of 
grasping how ‘understandings of Being’ emerge would be grasping how people 
moved from comparing the length of particular objects to singling out a particular 
object as a general standard for measuring other objects, how the use of equivalent 
measuring objects became ‘standard’ in the sense of being used across a group rather 
than just by an individual, etc., etc. No doubt each of these innovations embodies ‘a 
very large conceptual step’ (Morley and Renfrew 2010: 3); but we can imagine these 
steps being made out of more primitive forms of behaviour. If nothing else, it seems 
to be an interesting possibility that the study of ‘the emergence of understandings of 
 Heidegger attacks an analogous view at 1962: 409-10.41
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Being’ might fall not, say, to the historian of science, but instead to the anthropologist 
or archaeologist.  42
Plenty of questions remain, of course. For instance, are the examples of 
‘disclosures of being’ that I have offered really the kinds of examples that Heidegger 
has in mind? Proving that they are would require the kind of textual case that I have 
not provided here.  Such a case faces the difficulty that if there is one thing we lack 43
in Heidegger’s discussions of ‘understandings of Being’ in his work of the 1920s, it is 
examples: Haugeland acknowledges this explicitly (2000: 71, 72) and Lafont 
implicitly when she turns to discussion in lectures from 1935/36 (Heidegger 1967) in 
search of examples to fit her critical account.  I do believe that the examples I have 44
offered are in the spirit of Heidegger’s earlier thinking and, for instance, follow on 
naturally from his repeated invocations of the idea of measurement and of 
measurement tools in his discussions of the ‘founding’ of propositional truth, 
invocations which I have argued Lafont misunderstands. My examples also, of 
course, have the virtue that they, and the vision of an ‘understanding of Being’ they 
 This may also offer a different way of addressing the well-known worry that 42
Heidegger faces a difficulty in understanding how human intentionality relates to 
forms of animal awareness. Cf, e.g., Glendinning 1996, and Lafont’s insistence that 
Heidegger saw a significant gulf here (cf. her 2000: 235-36) ‘in spite of [his] efforts to 
establish finer distinctions’ (2000: 246 n. 6).
 I attempt to provide a textual case for thinking that the account I draw on here does 43
indeed capture Heidegger’s view in my forthcoming-a.
 Cf. Lafont 1999: 260 n. 32 and 2000: 259-75.44
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suggest, make possible a more charitable reading of these central themes in 
Heidegger’s work.  45
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